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Abstract
We explore the information content of counterparty identities and how their
disclosure can be exploited by other investors in a post-trade transparent market.
Using data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange, we form dynamic mean-variance
strategies with daily rebalancing which condition on the net ow of individual bro-
kers. We nd that investors can benet greatly, up to 36% in annualized risk
adjusted returns, from knowing who has been trading. We demonstrate a link be-
tween the information content of broker order ow and the sophistication of their
clients. Brokers who have clients that trade with a momentum style or who are
predominantly institutions or foreign investors have much more informative ow
than do others. In the Finnish setting, this means that brokers with large market
share have uninformative ows.
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1 Introduction
The implications of the disclosure of identities of traders and those submitting orders
for the outcomes (i.e. prices, trading activity and liquidity) in equity markets is an
area of ongoing debate. To date, though, there is little direct empirical evidence on the
information content of counterparty identities and how their disclosure can be exploited
by other investors. This scarcity is surprising given that it is received wisdom in nance
that, in fully transparent markets, costless observation of identities may allow investors
to make a trading prot by mimicking other, better informed investors. The `mimicking
assumption' plays a key role in the literature that examines the impact of anonymity on
liquidity and market eciency. Indeed, a number of empirical studies rely on it to explain
the nding that liquidity improves when anonymity is introduced.1
However, the validity of the mimicking argument is questionable for at least two
reasons. First, as a matter of market reality, identities of traders are available at best
at the broker level. This means that underlying informed client trades are aggregated
with trades of uninformed customers so that the overall information content of a broker's
ow is unclear. Second, using simple ecient markets logic, in a setting with post-trade
disclosure of identities, one would expect that any economically signicant information
that could be inferred from identities should already be reected in prices.
Our aim in this paper is to provide some direct analysis of the economic value of
observing broker identities and to explore when and why they are most valuable. We
form dynamic mean-variance portfolios with daily rebalancing in the fashion of Fleming
et al. (2001), using daily order ows from individual brokers to forecast the cross-section
of stock returns. Order ow is measured as aggressive buy trades less sell trades in
an interval as in Chordia et al. (2002) and Evans and Lyons (2002).2 We test directly
1See e.g., Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), Foucault et al. (2007), Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009),
Friederich and Payne (2011) among others.
2Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) provide the theoretical foundations for the information
content of order ow. Empirically, evidence from Hasbrouck (1991), Evans and Lyons (2002), Payne
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whether mimicking strategies generate signicant economic gains using data from the
Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX), a post-trade transparent market, in which the broker
identity is publicly available. We then compare performance of the trading rule across
brokers and analyze which type of broker is most protable to mimic in order to shed
light on the economics that underly our results.
We start by comparing the performance of the broker portfolios against a benchmark
portfolio that disregards identity information. We show that broker portfolios outperform
the benchmark portfolio. An investor with mean-variance preferences can improve his
portfolio performance by up to 36% in annualized risk-adjusted terms using broker identity
information. It is worth noting that if we extend the broker-level order ow measure
used to include trades in which a broker was the passive counterparty, then there is no
signicant improvement in trading rule performance.3 Regardless, our baseline result is
that using publicly available order ow information from brokers can generate positive
risk-adjusted returns.
A second result from our work is that the information content of ows varies across
brokers and we dig into the reasons for this. Intuitively, one would expect that the
degree of sophistication of a broker's investor base should play the key role in determining
the information content of the broker's net ow. As we do not have direct access to
information on broker clienteles we use proxies based on publicly available trading data
for the sophistication of the broker clientele.4
(2003), Love and Payne (2008), and Rime et al. (2010) among others, demonstrates the important role
of order ow measure on the transmission of private and public information into prices.
3Some recent work, for example Latza and Payne (2013), shows that intra-day ows of limit orders are
better forecasters of stock returns than are market order ows. In this context, our results might be seen
as surprising. It is worth noting, though, that the sampling frequencies of the current work and Latza
and Payne (2013) dier greatly and that they use data on all orders, executed and unexecuted. In our
work we have access only to completed trades i.e. executed orders.
4As the trade data we use to proxy sophistication is public, it can be used by any market participant
to identify the most informative broker identities. This approach is in contrast to the literature on
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We rst examine brokers with respect to their market share. Previous literature
suggests that market leaders have better information than other traders.5 Arguments
to support these results usually rely on underlying customers being more sophisticated.
We test if this assertion holds in HEX, and nd that a portfolio based on large broker
ows signicantly underperforms a portfolio based on small broker ows. The order ow
information of large brokers has on average no predictive power at the daily horizon. This
result is striking in that it runs counter to other results in the literature.
One explanation for this striking result, however, is that the largest brokers' net
trades do not reect the trades of sophisticated investors at all. It is possible that market
leaders have very heterogeneous customer bases such that, when trades are aggregated,
the noise trades from the uninformed drown the signal from the smart customers. Using
the framework of Lakonishok et al. (1992) we provide empirical evidence that supports
this explanation: large brokers' order ow is relatively balanced on buy and sell sides,
while the trades of small brokers tend to locate either on the buy or on the sell side.
Although our result seems to run counter to conventional belief, it is consistent with
prior evidence from Finland. For example, Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) report that large
brokers have customers drawn fairly equally from all segments of the investor universe, but
with households being their major pool of customers. On the other hand, small brokers
represent mostly foreign investors and domestic institutions. As Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2000) note, in Finland domestic households are the least sophisticated investors, while
foreign investors are the most sophisticated.6 Therefore it seems that the order ow of
information asymmetries across dierent types of investors (e.g., institutional vs. retail investor (e.g.,
Barber et al. (2009a)), banks vs. retail traders (e.g., Nolte and Voev (2011)) etc), as the type of an
ultimate investor is virtually never made public.
5See e.g., Goodhart (1988), Lyons (1997), and Peiers (1997). One exception is Sapp (2002) who nds the
opposite result.
6We quote from Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000): \All of the Finnish investor categories are probably less
sophisticated than the foreign investors. Foreign investors tend to be well capitalized foreign nancial
institutions with a long history of successful investment in other stock markets. This category is generally
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large brokers is likely to be an aggregation of noise, while small brokers aggregate the
trades of better informed and more sophisticated investors.
In a second step, we examine whether brokers who have unusually large order ows
(regardless their average market share) on a particular day-stock convey more information
to market than do others. We regard this exercise as an attempt to identify higher fre-
quency (i.e. daily) variations in information content of brokers' net trades. The intuition
is simple. In a post-trade transparent setting, earlier work (e.g., Rindi (2008)) suggests
that sophisticated traders will exploit their information advantage very aggressively in an
attempt to mitigate problems from information leakage7. Our analysis supports this view.
The order ow of the most active brokers on a particular day, has a major impact on the
following day's prices. This impact lasts for one day only, however. Hence although large
average trading volumes are rather uninformative, trading concentration in a short period
of time does capture 'smart trading activity'.
Another sophistication proxy identied by prior literature is the use of momentum
trading styles. Both Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Linnainmaa (2010) show that the
more sophisticated investors in Finland exhibit a momentum investment style. In other
markets, Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Goetzmann and Massa (2002) nd similar patterns.
Using the framework of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), we characterize the trades of each
broker as being either momentum or contrarian on average. Then, we show that the order
ow of brokers whose customers trade with a momentum style in aggregate (momentum
brokers) better predicts future returns than ow from brokers with contrarian clients.
Again, sophistication is proxied using observable data and brokers with more sophisticated
clienteles have more informative ows. We provide some further evidence to support the
link between brokers whose trading activity exhibits momentum and sophistication as we
measure each broker's stock picking ability and show that momentum brokers are better
composed of mutual funds, hedge funds, and foreign investment banks".
7Another strategy to hide information could by the usage of multiple brokers. However, evidence from
Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) suggests that trading through multiple brokers is not common in Finland.
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stock pickers.
Overall our results support the notion that observing broker level order ow, even
when it is publicly available, can allow one to earn positive excess returns. The result that
identity information is valuable is in line with expectations, but it is worth noting that all
of the information in our portfolio construction experiments is public such that the results
provide a challenge to full market eciency. More strikingly, we show that public data
can also be used to discriminate between brokers and to identify those most likely to have
informative ows. Brokers who have clients that trade with a momentum style or who
are predominantly institutions or foreign investors have much more informative ow than
do others. In the Finnish setting, this means that brokers with large market share have
uninformative ows. Our work clearly has elements in common with Linnainmaa and
Saar (2012), who also look at Finnish data and who categorise brokers by the structure
of their customer base. While they use proprietary data to make this link, we show that
one can roughly approximate client sophistication using data that is publicly distributed.
Moreover, we show that this information can be exploited to generate economic value
through the use of a simple trading rule.8
Given that our analysis does not study a change in anonymity regime, our results
can say little about the direct linkages between liquidity, eciency and transparency.
However, many of the models which do link transparency to market quality rely on the
mimicking assumption that we test in this paper. To the extent that we nd evidence
that mimicking the trades of more sophisticated agents can lead to economic gains, we
support the notion that full transparency might be costly for markets, and thus investors.
It may discourage sophisticated investors from expending eort to uncover information
leading to less ecient prices and lower liquidity. It should be noted, though, that the
8It is also worth noting that Finnish equity market microstructure changed in between our sample and
that of Linnainmaa and Saar (2012). In their sample, the market was pre and post trade non-anonymous,
while in our data sample the market was only pre-trade anonymous. This means that in our sample, one
could only gain information about trader identities from trade reports, as we do.
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fact that we nd evidence of prots from mimicking implies that this strategy is not being
so aggressively pursued by market participants that the opportunity disappears.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
set we use. Section 3 presents the empirical framework. In Section 4, we discuss the
empirical results of the baseline mean-variance analysis. In Section 5, we investigate the
determinants of the information content of broker order ow and broker heterogeneity.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
We use intraday equity data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX), which are provided
by Bloomberg. HEX has been part of NASDAQ OMX Group since 2007. As advertised
on their website, the NASDAQ OMX Group is the world's largest exchange company.
NASDAQ OMX Nordic describes the common oering from NASDAQ OMX exchanges
in Helsinki, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Iceland, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. These exchanges
use a common trading platform, which allows for cross-border trading and settlement, and
cross membership.
Our data set begins at 8am (GMT) on Monday 29th March 2010 and ends at 4:30pm
on Monday 28th February 2011; this amounts to 210 trading days. In our analysis, we
consider the 15 most liquid (in terms of turnover) stocks of the HEX25 index, in order to
circumvent problems arising from the low number of transactions of some brokers. Table
2 reports the summary statistics of the 15 stocks. Every day there are 4 regular trading
sessions: opening (7am-8am), continuous trading (8am-4:25pm), closing (4:25pm-4:30pm)
and after market (4:30pm-7am). We restrict the empirical analysis to the continuous
trading session. HEX is classied as a post-trade transparent market, as in addition to
the typical information on price and volume, the identity of the counterparty who bought
9Interested readers might read a related policy discussion on the implications of introducing transparency
in dark pools on the \Securities and Exchange Commission; Concept Regulation of Non-Public Trading
Interest; Proposed Rule, November 23, 2009, Federal Register 74(224), 61207-61238.
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and sold is also provided for executed trades. The counterparty identity is not available
for limit orders - pre-trade anonymity. The investor type behind each trade, such as
whether it is an end-investor or a trade on broker's own account is also not provided.
The raw data contains information on 7 items, as shown in the 5 second span of
Nokia transaction data shown in Table 3. The rst two columns are the date and time
expressed as month/day/year and hour:minute:second, respectively. The third column is
the type of the transaction, which can be\Best Bid", \Best Ask"or\Trade". The next two
columns are the price (in Euros) and the size of the transaction. The last two columns
are the Broker Buy Code and the Broker Sell Code. In Table 1 we list the brokers from
HEX.10 The counterparty identity is available only for transactions of type \Trade".
The data record does not provide the direction of trade. However, the availability
of best bid and best ask quotes, as well as their time stamp enables us to identify which
broker initiated the trade and, thus, the direction of the trade. This identication is an
important element in our empirical analysis, since it allows us to disaggregate the data
and construct distinct order ow measures for every broker.
3 Empirical Framework
3.1 The Formation of Dynamic Mean-Variance Portfolios
Our empirical analysis relies on the formation of dynamic mean-variance portfolios. Our
investment scenario considers an investor with mean-variance preferences, who allocates
his wealth across the 15 most liquid stocks of the HEX and the risk-free asset. Rebalancing
10We drop brokers that do not trade in all stocks, are acquired by other brokers, are not members for the
entire sample period, and those who initiate (on average, across stocks) less that 10 trades every day and
are active (on average, across stocks) in less than half of the days of our sample period. We do that to
deal with the computational problems arising from zero observations when we estimate the order ow
models (Section 3), and to increase the power of the LSV statistic and the buy ratios (Section 5). The
results remain qualitatively the same if instead we use all brokers.
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is daily and conditional on the observation of the previous day's trading activity, which is
captured by order ow measures. HEX being a non-anonymous market allows investors
to observe not only the aggregate market order ow, but also the customer order ow of
brokers. Either order ow is an input to investor's optimization problem, which is given
by:
max
wjt
p;t+1jt = w
j
t
0jN;t+1jt + (  wjt 0)Rft
s:t: 2p = w
j
t
0t+1jtw
j
t ; t = 1; : : : ; T ;
(1)
where j = 1; : : : ; J identies brokerj, wjt is the N  1 vector of portfolio weights; p;t+1jt
is the conditional expected portfolio return; p is the target portfolio volatility; t+1jt is
the N  N variance-covariance matrix of the risky assets; Rft is the risk free rate; and
jN;t+1jt is the N  1 vector of expected returns of the risky assets conditional on the
order ow information of brokerj, jN;t+1jt = E[Rt+1jIjt ]. The solution to this constrained
maximization problem yields,
wjt =
p 
 1
t+1jt (
j
N;t+1jt   Rft )q
(jN;t+1jt   Rft )0  1t+1jt (jN;t+1jt   Rft )
: (2)
These are the weights for the risky assets at each rebalancing time interval. The invest-
ment in the risk free asset is equal to 1   wjt 0 . Then, the period t + 1 gross return on
the investor's portfolio is given by 1 + wjt
0Rt+1 + (1  wjt 0)Rf .
A key element in Equation 2 is the vector of conditional expected returns of risky
assets. We presume that the information set of the aggregate market and that of brokers
dier. We approximate these information sets by using transaction data to compute order
ow measures. There is an extensive literature on order ow and how it can impact returns
not only through short-term liquidity and inventory eects, but also because it conveys
information11. Our methodological contribution to this literature is the disaggregation of
11See e.g., Hasbrouck (1991), Chordia et al. (2002), Evans and Lyons (2002), Easley et al. (2002), Payne
(2003), Pasquariello and Vega (2007), Evans and Lyons (2008), Berger et al. (2008), Love and Payne
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the order ow measure at the aggregate market and the broker rm level. That means
that for every stock, we have as many conditional expected return estimates as the number
of brokers plus the aggregate market estimate.
In our analysis, we use 2 order ow specications. The rst one is the standard order
ow (OF jt ) measure of Chordia et al. (2002) and Evans and Lyons (2002), dened as the
daily buyer-initiated volume minus the seller-initiated volume. This measure captures
aggressive trading, which is considered to transmit new information into prices. To see
whether liquidity-supplying (passive trading) conveys information too, we use a second
specication, the V olOF jt , dened as the total buy volume minus the total sell volume
executed by brokerj12.
Building on these order ow measures, we use 2 parsimonious models to compute
one-day-ahead estimates of stock returns13. The rst model (M1) is a pure order ow
model:
Rit+1 =  + OF
ij
t + t+1; i = 1; : : : ; 15; (3)
where j identies brokerj, Rit+1 is the return of stock i, OF
ij
t is the order ow measure
of brokerj on stock i,  is a coecient,  is a constant, and t+1 the error term. To
capture liquidity supply, Model 2 (M2) uses the second order ow measure, V olOF jit , as
an additional variable:
Rit+1 =  + OF
ij
t + V olOF
ij
t + t+1; (4)
(2008), Nolte and Nolte (2010).
12To clarify things, the dierence between OF jt and V olOF
j
t is that the former used only marketable orders,
while the latter uses all trades, which includes aggressive (marketable orders) and passive (limit orders)
volume. We are able to calculate V olOF jt because our dataset contains the identity of the broker that
bought and sold in every transaction. By construction, this order ow denition is zero for the aggregate
market; the daily buy volume always equals the daily sell volume.
13Rime et al. (2010) use order ow measures to predict returns in a foreign exchange context.
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In unreported results we also include the market return, the HEX25 index, in an
attempt to capture market-wise economic activity at time t and control for momentum
eects. However, we nd that market return does not play any signicant role.
3.2 Performance Measures
The next step in our analysis is to measure the performance of the mean-variance portfo-
lios. We use an economic evaluation approach and two criteria; a traditional performance
measure, the Sharpe ratio, and a utility-based measure, the manipulation-proof perfor-
mance measure (MPPM) of Goetzmann et al. (2007). The rst economic criterion, the
ex-post Sharpe ratio (SR), is dened as:
SRj =
Rjp  Rf
jp
; (5)
where the nominator is the average (annualized) excess portfolio return and the denom-
inator is the portfolio's (annualized) standard deviation. Intuitively, the Sharpe ratio
measures the risk-adjusted annualized portfolio's returns.
The second economic criterion, MPPM, is dened as:
MPPM j =
1
(1  )t ln
24 1
(T   1)
T 1X
t=1
 
Rjp;t+1
Rft+1
!1 35 ; (6)
where Rjp;t+1 is the gross portfolio return obtained when using broker's j order ow to
forecast expected returns, Rft+1 is the gross risk free return, t is the one day interval,
and  can be seen as the investor's relative risk aversion coecient. MPPM j can be
interpreted as the annualized continuously compounded excess return certainty equivalent
of the portfolio that uses brokerj order ow information to predict returns. The advantage
of this economic measure is that it does not require an assumption of the investor's utility
function, and it is robust to the distribution of the portfolio returns.
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Our interest lies on the performance dierences rather than on the performance of
the mean-variance portfolios per se. We therefore use as a benchmark the portfolio that
uses the aggregate market order ow (ANON), which is the one that disregards the broker
identity. The performance dierence against the ANON portfolio allows us to measure
the predictive power of the customer order ow of brokers. If broker identity contains no
information, this dierence should be zero. In contrast, a positive performance dierence
will unveil the predictive power of broker identity14. The latter is not an obvious outcome.
One reason is that brokers \collect" and execute orders most probable from a diverse pool
of investors, which contains not only informed, but also uninformed traders. In addition,
even in the case of informed trading, the disclosure of identities takes place post-trade,
which means that prices might already reect any valuable information. Therefore the
predictive power of broker identity is an empirical question.
We test this hypothesis by calculating the following performance dierence measure:
j =MPPM j  MPPMANON : (7)
j enables us to compare competitive dynamic investment strategies. Intuitively, it is the
fee that a mean-variance investor is willing to pay to switch from the benchmark asset
allocation strategy to the strategy under investigation. A positive j will mean that the
investor will be better-o using brokerj order ow information than using the aggregate
market order ow information.
There are a number of papers that use utility-based measures to determine the eco-
nomic value of a dynamic strategy versus a passive strategy. For instance, Fleming et al.
(2001) investigate the economic value of volatility timing and Marquering and Verbeek
(2004) analyze the economic value of predicting both stock index returns and volatility.
14Intuitively, in a market where some investors have privileged access to customer order ow (e.g. in a
anonymous market in which brokers reveal their customer order ow to their favorite investors) the value
of knowing who trades will be even larger.
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While we follow a similar approach, a critical dierence is the fact that our benchmark
strategy is not passive, but dynamic. Here, the information sets captured by our order
ow models dier, not the style of investment strategy. By selecting the same dynamic
strategy for the benchmark portfolio, we can isolate the eect of market transparency on
portfolio performance from other eects associated with the style of asset management
(i.e., active versus passive management)15.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we measure the predictive power of ows form individual brokers. The
investment scenario is based on an investor with a coecient of relative risk aversion of
6, who maximizes his expected portfolio return subject to an annual target volatility of
p=10%. Our choice of p and  is consistent with previous literature (see e.g., Rime et al.
(2010) and Della Corte et al. (2010)). Choosing alternative values of p and  leaves our
results qualitatively unchanged. Our choice of risk free rate is the one month eurodollar
rate (mnemonic is ECEUR1M), which is available on a daily basis. We use order ow
models M1-M2, described in Section 3.1 to predict returns and rebalance portfolio weights
on a daily basis. This recursive out-of-sample regression estimation is based on a window
of expanding size that means that the investor uses all available historical information
on day t to update his beliefs and optimize his asset allocation on day t + 1. The initial
estimation window is 03/30/2010{08/09/2010 (86 days or 40% of the sample period) and
the portfolio formation and rebalancing runs from 08/10/2010 to 02/28/2011 (124 days
or 60% of our sample period).16 We compute the variance-covariance matrix of the risky
assets recursively on each day using data from the previous one year to forecast volatility
at t+1.
15Our results do not change qualitatively when a passive benchmark strategy is chosen instead.
16Results remain qualitatively similar if instead we split the sample period in two equal windows.
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4.1 Preliminary Analysis
Before we proceed to the recursive out-of-sample estimation we present some preliminary
results to obtain an indication of the statistical performance of the order ow models
in the initial estimation window. To save space we present results only for model M1.
Results for the other model are available upon request.
Figure 1 gives a picture of the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected (Newey-
West) t-statistics on the lagged order ow variable (OF) in model M1. M1 is the model in
Equation 3, in which we regress the returns of stock i (Ri) on the previous period's order
ow measure, which is calculated either at the aggregate market level (i.e. OFiANON) or
at the individual broker level (i.e., OF ij). The rst statistic (blue bars) shows the number
of positive order ow coecients, while the second statistic (red bars) is the number of
statistically signicant coecients. As we can see, on the one end, there are brokers like
SHB or SWB with many signicant coecients, while at the other end there are brokers
like NIP and NON with barely any signicant coecients. The sign of the order ow
coecient is positive for half of the estimates, while for almost one third of the brokers,
the majority of their coecients is positive. A positive coecient indicates that order ow
and next day's return are positively related; buy (sell) pressure on a particular trading
day predicts a price increase (decrease) the next trading day, although it remains to be
sees whether this is reected in the portfolio performance.
In Table 4, we move from statistical to economic evaluation. We want to stress that
results in this table are from an in-sample estimation, since the order ow coecients are
estimated only once using the rst 86 days of the dataset and portfolios are constructed
for the same 86 days. In the out-of-sample estimation, we repeat this computation in
each of the next 128 days. In short, the results show that investors can improve their
portfolio performance when they observe brokers' customer order ow compared to the
benchmark case, which is the portfolio that disregards the broker identity. The number
of positive  ranges from 18 for Model 1 to 22 for Model 2. However, not all of these 
13
are statistical signicant, with the best model being Model 2 with 6 statistical signicant
 (p-value< 10%)17. Among the brokers that perform well across all models are DBL,
DDB, JPM, NRD, and SWB. As for the Sharpe ratios, they are high across all brokers
and models, which is expected as these are in-sample calculations with daily rebalancing.
Their magnitude is consistent with other papers that use order ow models with daily
rebalancing. For instance, Rime et al. (2010) nd in-sample Sharpe ratios that range
from 5.79 to 7.05.
The results in this section support our hypothesis regarding the positive economic
value of market transparency. However, the real test lies in the out-of-sample evaluation
of the recursive forecasts and the performance of the mean-variance portfolios that follow
in the next section.
4.2 Does Broker Identity Convey Information?
In this section, we test the hypothesis that the broker identity conveys information and
that investors can benet from transparency. Our analysis is based on an out-of-sample
recursive regression estimation.
Table 5 presents the economic evaluation of the mean-variance portfolios. For the
majority of brokers, Sharpe ratios are large, positive and greater than the Sharpe ratio
of the ANON portfolio, which is negative. The same holds for s. More specically, the
reported p-values are below at least 10% (5%) for 11 (7) brokers for Model 1 and, 7 (2)
brokers for Model 2. To better illustrate the results, in Figure 2 we present the brokers
in descending order with respect to . It is clear that on average broker portfolios
outperform the benchmark portfolio. The s are positive and signicant for almost one
third of brokers. Among the best performer brokers are CAR, NRD, RBN, SHB and
SWB. One interpretation of a positive  is that it measures the maximum performance
17The number of signicant  increases to 9 when the market portfolio is included, which controls for
market-wise developments and momentum eects. For brevity, we do not report these results.
14
fee the mean-variance investor is willing to pay to switch from the ANON portfolio, which
is the one that disregards the broker identity, to the portfolio that tracks brokerj customer
order ow. Hence we conclude that the broker identity conveys economically signicant
information.
Another nding in Table 5 is that the predictive power of broker identities mainly
comes from the marketable limit orders, which captures aggressive trading. In contrast,
passive trading activity, V olOF jt , most often decreases the magnitude and signicance of
the s. The trades that brokers initiate are more informative than those they participate
in but which are initiated by others.
In the literature evaluating the performance of dynamic investment strategies, trans-
action costs play a key role. However, in unreported results, we nd that the predictive
power of identities is robust to the presence of transaction costs; transaction costs either
play a minor or even a supportive role. This is in line with our expectations, as in our
framework the benchmark portfolio follows also a dynamic investment strategy, thus, in
the presence of transaction costs its performance will be aected too. These results are
available upon request.
The evidence to this point suggests that even in a post-trade transparent market
the information about broker identities is useful for other investors: market transparency
yields positive economic value. Specically, investors can erase the noise from the aggre-
gate market by observing brokers' customer order ow and greatly improve their invest-
ment decision making up to 36% (annualized) percentage points (Model 1). This nding
is consistent with the theoretical models by Forster and George (1992) and Benveniste
et al. (1992), that suggest that the observation of identities can give rise to private bene-
ts and trading prots. Other models that examines the eects of dual trading and front
running (e.g., Roell (1990), Fishman and Longsta (1992)) also suggest that observing
who trades can produce trading prots. However, in these studies the observation of who
trades is a privilege of only a few market participants, while in our setting the information
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about the trades of brokers is public information.
Another nding from Table 5 is the strong heterogeneity in results across brokers.
Sharpe ratios range from -1.61 to 2.93 for Model 1.  varies too: from -10 to 36 and -15 to
38 for Models 1 and 2, respectively. It is not immediately clear why the predictive power
of identity is strong for some brokers and zero for some others. From a practical point of
view, it is important to know what drives this heterogeneity in order to understand the
dynamics of information generation and aggregation at the broker level. Intuitively, one
would expect that the degree of sophistication of brokers' investor base should play a key
role. We elaborate upon this issue in the next section.
5 The Determinants of the Information Content of Broker Cus-
tomer Order Flow
Our analysis suggests that the dissemination of data on who is trading and in which
direction can help others investors to make better investment decisions. However, this
result depends on the ex-ante ability of investors to select the brokers with the most
informative customer order ow. Here, we explore the determinants of the information
content of brokers' order ow. Intuitively, we expect the brokers with a more sophisticated
client base to have more informative trades. Therefore we test several hypotheses, using
only on publicly available information (e.g., market share and investment style), in an
attempt to understand what drives the predictive power of order ow at the broker level,
and whether it can be attributed to observable broker-specic characteristics.
5.1 The Role of Market Share: Large vs. Small Brokers
We start by exploring the role of brokers' market share. The simple intuition underlying
the market share hypothesis is as follows. Investors pay close attention to the trading
activity of market leaders. Who wouldn't take into account the trades of Goldman Sachs
or other big players? Several papers, provide the reason why; banks with large market
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share are, on average, better informed (see e.g., Goodhart (1988), Lyons (1997), and
Peiers (1997)). This is especially likely to be true in markets in which only a few brokers
control most of the trading activity. As shown in Table 6, HEX belongs to this category.
We calculate market share as the average daily volume initiated (only marketable limit
orders) or executed (all trades) by each broker across the 15 most liquid stocks of the
HEX. Table 6 shows that the brokerage industry in HEX is highly concentrated; the top
5 brokers initiate almost 40% of the trading and execute 35% of the volume.
To test whether the information content of ows varies with broker market share,
we split brokers into quartiles according to our 2 volume measures, see Table 6. Then
we construct daily order ow series for the top and bottom quartiles, and repeat the
formation, rebalancing, and evaluation of the two mean-variance portfolios following the
steps described in Section 3. We report the performance dierence  that is dened as:
 = Q4  Q1; (8)
where Q4 is the MPPM of top quartile and Q1 is the MPPM of the bottom quartile. A
positive and signicant  will indicate that large brokers have more informative order
ow than small brokers.
Table 7 presents the performance dierences between large and small brokers, and
the associated p-values. Surprisingly, we nd evidence that rejects the market share hy-
pothesis. The results in panel a. and b. show that the large broker portfolio signicantly
under performs the small broker portfolio. In other words, the order ow of brokers that
do the largest amounts of trading, whether aggressive or passive, is less informative than
the order ow of small brokers. These results suggest that the conventional belief that
the order ow of large brokers conveys information is not necessarily true.
One explanation could be that in Finland `smart investors' trade mainly through
small brokers, while `naive investors' prefer large brokers. Perhaps the clientele base of
all brokers consists of all types of investors but large brokers, because of their size and
17
reputation, attract on average the most heterogeneous customers with respect to level of
sophistication, investment strategies, and ultimately beliefs. If small brokers appeal more
to smart traders then their ows will be less noisy and more informative than that of
large brokers.
To elaborate on this heterogeneity of investors argument, we calculate correlated
trading statistics. Intuitively, there should be a negative relation between correlated
trading and broker clientele diversication; the more heterogeneous the investors are, the
more uncorrelated their aggregate trading activity will be. We use the Lakonishok et al.
(1992) framework to explore this relation.18
We dene the LSV statistic as:
Ht(j; i) = jBt(j; i)=Nt(j; i)  p(j; t)j   AFt(j; i); (9)
where B(j; i) is the number of brokerj trades in stock i during day t that are aggressive
purchases, N(j; i) is the number of all trades initiated by brokerj in stock i during day t,
p(j; t) is the expected proportion of all brokerj trades that are purchases on day t, and
AF (j; i) is an adjustment factor that captures that the rst term of the formula can be
greater than zero under the null hypothesis of no correlated trading. In our calculation
we account for the splitting of large orders eect in the same second, which otherwise will
articially increase the LSV measure. The LSV statistic is computed for each stock-day
and then averaged per broker19.
The results in Panel a. of Table 8, report correlated trading statistics, which vary
18Recent papers that use the same framework are: Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999), Barber et al.
(2009a), and Barber et al. (2009b).
19To illustrate our approach, suppose that in a given day half of the transactions initiated by broker
j are buys and half are sells. We can use this information to infer that broker j clients are trading
independently, and the LSV statistic will be close to zero. On the contrary, if 90% percent of broker's j
trades are buys, then we would conclude that broker j trading is highly correlated, and the LSV statistic
will be greater than zero.
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from 2% to 27%, for brokers CDG and RBN, respectively.20 That means that on average
the 52% of the trades initiated by broker CDG every day are on one side of the order book,
buys or sells, while this number increases to 77% for RBN. The most interesting result is
presented in Panel b: the average size of brokers in the bottom LSV quartile (Q1) is four
times the average size of the brokers in the top LSV quartile (Q4). This result supports
our argument that large brokers attract very heterogeneous customers. Panel c., shows
the underperformance of the portfolio that tracks brokers with very uncorrelated trading.
Clearly, our results document a connection between clientele heterogeneity, market share,
and predictive power of broker identity. It suggests that it is large brokers' clients' het-
erogeneous trading and dispersion of beliefs that causes the rejection of the market share
hypothesis. Meanwhile, it is still ambiguous what drives the strong predictive power of
small brokers. The heterogeneity argument alone cannot explain this. In addition we
require that small brokers are used by, on average, `smart investors'.
As we do not have investor transaction records, we rely on prior evidence from Finland
to provide supporting evidence. A recent paper of Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) utilizes
trading records from Helsinki and reports that large brokers' clientele is roughly evenly
split into the three major categories of investors, i.e. households, domestic institutions and
foreign investors. In fact, their major pool of customers is domestic households. On the
contrary, the investor base of small brokers is dominated by foreign investors, followed
domestic institutions. As Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) note, in Finland domestic
households are the least sophisticated investors, while foreign investors are the most
sophisticated. Specically, they argue that \[A]ll of the Finnish investor categories are
probably less sophisticated than the foreign investors. Foreign investors tend to be well
capitalized foreign nancial institutions with a long history of successful investment in
other stock markets. This category is generally composed of mutual funds, hedge funds,
20These results are consistent with the previous work of Dorn et al. (2008) and Barber et al. (2009b), who
document correlated trading among the clients of a German and a U.S. broker, respectively.
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and foreign investment banks". Therefore it seems that our results are driven by the
combination of heterogeneous client bases for large brokers and sophisticated clients for
small brokers. This means that large broker ow will be at best a noisy signal of future
returns while small broker ows will be much better predictors.
5.2 Active Brokers
Although the trades of large brokers are rather uninformative, in this section we explore
whether brokers who have unusually large order ows (positive or negative) on a particular
stock-day convey more information to market than do others. Our motivation is driven
by the typical argument in the market anonymity literature (e.g., Rindi (2008)) that in
a post-trade transparent setting the sophisticated traders will aggressively exploit their
information in an attempt to reduce information leakage. Intuitively, their aggressive
trading will be reected on the order ow of the most active brokers, in terms of their
customer trading volume, on a particular stock-day.
The key dierence from the previous section is that now we proxy sophistication at
a higher frequency (i.e. a day), and we allow mean-variance investors to update their
beliefs about the brokers with the more informative order ow on a daily basis. We
therefore form a dynamic mean-variance portfolio that tracks the most active brokers on
day t and stock i in order to predict future returns of stock i on day t + 1, t + 2 and
t + 3. Table 9 presents the performance against the ANON portfolio and the associated
p-values. We nd that the customer order ow of brokers who initiate heavy volume on
a particular day has very strong predictive power for the next day's returns (Panel a).
The predictability for returns on day t + 2 (Panel b) and t + 3 (Panel c) is statistically
insignicant. Hence the results of this section provide further support for the linkage
between smart or sophisticated clients and informativeness of order ow.
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5.3 Past-return-based Investment Style and Sophistication
Prior literature also links sophistication with investment patterns based on past returns,
particularly momentum trading.21 The typical argument is that informed and sophisti-
cated investors exhibit an momentum investment style: they buy past winners and sell
past losers. On the contrary, `naive investors' exhibit a contrarian investment style: they
buy past losers and sell past winners. In this section, we rst explore whether these be-
havioral patterns survive at the broker aggregation level, and then whether discriminating
between brokers with momentum and contrarian based ows can be useful for predicting
returns.
We follow the Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) framework to characterize brokers
in terms of their investment style. This framework consists of measuring the dierence
between the buy ratio of past winning stocks (top quartile) and the buy ratio of past
losing stocks (bottom quartile). The buy ratio of brokerj is dened as:
Buy Ratioj =
Buy Volumej
Buy Volumej + Sell Volumej
; (10)
where all volumes are calculated using trades initiated by broker j. We compute
daily and hourly buy ratios in order to capture both the daily and intradaily patterns. If
the dierence is positive (negative), then the broker is viewed as momentum (contrarian)
oriented at time t. We calculate buy ratio dierences for every time interval, and if the
fraction of days (or hours) with positive dierences is higher (lower) than 0:50, the broker
displays momentum (contrarian) behavior. We analyze statistical signicance with both
the standard two-sided binomial test and the AR(1)-adjusted binomial test suggested in
21See e.g., Grinblatt et al. (1995), Goetzmann and Massa (2002), Grin et al. (2003). Bloomeld et al.
(2009) show that short-term momentum is mainly caused by sophisticated informed traders. Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2000) nd that in HEX the more sophisticated investors are, the more momentum is their
behavior. Hvidkjaer (2006) reports evidence for informed trading among large traders, whose investment
style is momentum.
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Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000).22 To save space we do not report the p-values of the
second test, as they are very similar to those produced by the standard test.
Table 10 presents the fractions of positive buy ratio dierences for the intraday and
daily horizon, along with the p-values of the associated binomial tests. We observe strong
behavioral patterns, both reversal and momentum, at all frequencies. The fraction of
positive buy ratio dierences varies from 0:34 to 0:60 and 0:28 to 0:68 at the 1 hour
and 1 day horizon, respectively. At the daily horizon, FOR, SAB, and UBS are the
brokers with the stronger momentum behavior (65%, 68%, and 59%, respectively), and
AAL, DBL, and NRD the brokers with the stronger contrarian behavior (39%, 28%, and
35%, respectively). When we move to the intraday frequency, reversal patterns become
stronger and the number of signicant contrarian brokers doubles.
Our results are broadly consistent with ndings of the previous literature. Grin-
blatt and Keloharju (2000) show that investors in Finland exhibit both contrarian and
momentum behavior at daily horizon, depending on their degree of sophistication, with
the least sophisticated investors being contrarian. Linnainmaa (2010) also documents
reversal eects using data from HEX. More recently, Heston et al. (2010) nd that the
strong intraday return reversals in NYSE are reversed at the daily frequency, a nding
that resembles the weakening of contrarian behavior at the daily frequency in our sample.
Next, we measure the performance dierence between a portfolio that tracks ows
from momentum brokers and a portfolio that uses contrarian broker ows. We apply
the analysis of the previous section (see Equation 8) and test whether the customer
order ow of the statistically signicant (p-value< 5%) momentum brokers contains bet-
22The z-test statistic of this test is dened as:
z =
x  T=2p
T=4 + [(2p  1)T+1   T (2p  1)2 + (2p  1)(T   1)]=16(1  T )2] ; (11)
where x is the the fraction of positive buy ratio dierences, p is the observed proportion of continuations,
and T is number of trading days.
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ter information than that of the statistically signicant contrarian brokers. We use the
characterisations of momentum and contrarian behaviour based on daily data. Table 11
presents the results for Models 1 to 2. We nd that the order ow of brokers whose av-
erage customer exhibits a momentum investment style has statistically strong predictive
power for future returns. In contrast, the order ow of contrarian brokers has zero pre-
dictive power. As for the performance dierences, , they are positive, varying from 9
to 28 percentage points. We therefore conclude that the order ow of momentum brokers
is more informative than the order ow of contrarian brokers.
The evidence that the order ow of momentum investors conveys information is in
line with the earlier literature that nd a linkage of this particular trading style and
the sophistication level.23 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) suggest that another way to
capture this linkage is by constructing measures of stock picking ability, which is what
we do next. In particular, we measure the stock picking ability of brokers by examining
the buy ratios of future returns. If the average buy ratio of future winning stocks (top
quartile) exceeds the buy ratio of future losing stocks (bottom quartile), then this provides
evidence of high stock picking ability and, thus, evidence of sophistication. Future returns
are the cumulative daily returns of the next 1 month and 3 months. We compute buy
ratio dierences for every day and if the fraction of days with positive dierences is higher
(lower) than 0.50, the broker displays high (low) stock picking ability.
We focus on the two extreme quartiles - the brokers with the highest stock picking
ability (Q4) and the brokers with the lowest stock picking ability (Q1) - and compare the
average investment style of each group. Table 12 shows that the dierences of the two
groups are large and statistically signicant from zero (p-value 0%): 0.57 vs. 0.48 and
0.56 vs. 0.46 for the 1 month and 3 months horizon, respectively. Hence, in line with our
23In unreported results, we examine if the returns of the momentum brokers' portfolio can be explained
solely due to a momentum premium. We nd that the momentum premium cannot fully explain the
momentum brokers' portfolio returns, leaving space for the superiority of their customer order ow
information story.
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expectations we nd additional supportive evidence to the linkage of the brokers' client
sophistication with momentum behavior.
6 Conclusion
The nancial crisis of 2008 has triggered a discussion in the nance community about the
need to move to more transparent market structures. Policy makers in the US and Europe
have already taken steps into this direction. One of the dimensions of transparency that is
in play concerns the disclosure of counterparty identity. Yet there is little direct empirical
evidence on the information content of counterparty identities in brokered markets and on
how their disclosure might impact other investors, especially in the post-trade disclosure
case.
In this paper, we provide direct empirical evidence on these issues. In particular,
we explore whether counterparty identities convey information and, if so, how this infor-
mation can be exploited by other investors. To facilitate our analysis we use data from
Helsinki Stock Exchange, in which broker identities are (post-trade) publicly available.
Within a simple mean-variance framework with daily rebalancing we show that broker
identity conveys economically signicant information. More specically, we nd that
mean-variance investors can improve their trading prots by observing the order ow of
individual brokers. This is translated into a superior portfolio performance up to 36%
annualized percentage points compared to the benchmark investment scenario, in which
investors disregard broker identity information.
We next investigate why the identity of some brokers is more informative than others
and nd that there is a linkage between the information content of their order ow and
the sophistication of their client base. It is worth noting that we use only publicly
available transaction data to proxy for client sophistication. Our analysis shows that
brokers who have clients that trade with a momentum style or who are predominantly
institutions or foreign investors have much more informative ow than brokers with a
24
more contrarian and heterogeneous client base. Surprisingly, in the Finnish setting, this
means that brokers with large market share have less informative ows. Overall, our
work suggests that the disclosure of identities can lead to the existence of protable
mimicking strategies, and investors can earn positive excess returns by utilizing public
identity information.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Statistical Performance of the rst (M1) Forecasting Model.
The graph gives an indication of the statistical performance of the rst order ow model (M1,
Equation 3) in the initial estimation window (03=30=2010{08=09=2010, 86 days). In particular, we report
2 summary statistics of the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected (Newey-West) t-statistics
of the order ow (OF) coecient. The rst statistic is the number of positive coecients (#1 - blue
bar) and the second statistic is the total number of signicant coecients (#2 - red bar). OF is dened
as the daily dierence between the buyer-initiated and seller-initiated volume. Statistical signicant is
on a 10% level.
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Figure 2: The Ranking of the Informativeness of Broker Identities.
The graph presents the out-of-sample performance of the mean-variance portfolios in descending
order (from left to right) with respect to the  performance measure. We take the data from Table 5,
where details on the methodology can be found. Briey, the investment scenario is based on a risk-averse
investor, who maximizes his expected portfolio return subject to an annual target volatility p = 10%.
Every day, the investor forecasts next day's returns using the order ow models (M1 and M2) described
in Section 3.1, and then rebalances his portfolio weights. There is one portfolio for each broker (x-axis).
In Panel A (Panel B) we present the ranking of brokers' portfolios for M1 (M2). * indicates that the
associated  is statistical signicant, p-value is on a 10% level. The red line separates the group of
signicant and insignicant brokers.
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Table 1: List of Brokers in HEX
These are the brokers of HEX ranked alphabetically. The rst 2 columns are the full
name and the code of brokers, respectively. The third column is the nationality of
brokers. The letter R in the last column identies the remote members. (Source:
http://nordic.nasdaqomxtrader.com/membershipservices/membershiplist)
Broker Name Code Country RM
Alandsbanken Abp AAL Finland
ABN AMRO Clearing Bank N.V FOR Netherlands R
BNP Paribas Arbitrage SNC BPP France R
Carnegie Investment Bank AB CAR Sweden
Citadel Securities (Europe) Limited CDG UK R
Citigroup Global Markets Limited SAB UK R
Credit Agricole Cheuvreux Nordic AB CDV Sweden
Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd CSB UK R
Danske Bank A/S DDB Denmark
Deutsche Bank AG DBL UK R
Evli Bank Abp EVL Finland
FIM Bank Ltd. FIM Finland
Goldman Sachs International GSI UK R
Instinet Europe Limited INT UK R
JP Morgan Securities Ltd JPM UK R
Knight Capital Europe Limited KEM UK R
Merrill Lynch International MLI UK R
Morgan Stanley Co. International Ltd. MSI UK R
NeoNet Securities AB NEO Sweden
Nomura International plc NIP UK R
Nordea Bank Finland Plc NRD Finland
Nordnet Bank AB NON Sweden
Pohjola Bank Plc OPS Finland
SAXO-E*TRADE Bank A/S DIF Denmark
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB ENS Sweden
Societe Generale S.A. SGP France R
Swedbank AB SWB Sweden
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB Sweden
The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. RBN UK R
UBS Limited UBS UK R
UB Securities Limited UB Finland
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Table 2: Summary Statistics.
The table reports the name, mean (%), standard deviation (%), maximum (%), minimum (%),
skewness, and kurtosis of the returns of the 15 most liquid stocks of HEX. All statistics are calculated
over the daily interval for the whole sample period 03/30/2010 - 02/28/2011. The last column, reports
the total aggressive turnover ('000,000) traded in each stock during the whole sample period.
03/30/2010 - 02/28/2011
# Name Mean Std Max Min Skew Kurt Turn
1 Elisa 0.03 1.36 7.08 -6.23 0.40 8.19 1,624
2 Fortum 0.09 1.34 4.75 -5.60 -0.28 4.81 7,059
3 Kone 0.11 1.57 5.77 -4.35 0.20 4.08 3,489
4 Konecranes 0.16 2.05 8.74 -4.69 0.78 5.23 1,641
5 Metso 0.18 2.49 9.35 -6.68 0.14 3.76 5,090
6 Neste Oil -0.01 1.71 6.77 -6.65 -0.23 4.66 2,318
7 Nokia -0.26 2.36 6.09 -15.33 -2.45 16.71 38,370
8 Nokian Renkaat 0.18 2.06 9.88 -5.89 0.58 5.07 2,990
9 Outokumpu -0.10 2.15 8.44 -6.63 0.23 4.26 3,374
10 Outotec 0.18 2.51 11.40 -8.14 0.28 4.59 2,616
11 Rautarukki K 0.01 2.15 8.60 -5.85 0.49 4.39 1,978
12 Sampo A 0.06 1.53 8.89 -6.01 0.51 8.12 5,267
13 Stora Enso R 0.16 2.23 8.07 -6.68 0.12 3.86 6,095
14 UPM-Kymmene 0.16 2.04 8.44 -5.76 0.07 4.27 6,512
15 Wartsila Abp 0.17 2.08 9.61 -5.24 0.32 4.78 3,280
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Table 3: A 5 Second Slice of the Transaction Data of Nokia
This is a 5 second slice of the transaction data of Nokia. The rst two columns are the date
and time expressed as month/day/year and hour:minute:second, respectively. The third column is
the type of transaction, which can be Best Bid, Best Ask or Trade. The next two columns are the
price (in euros) and the size of transaction. The last two columns are the Broker Buy Code and the
Broker Sell Code.
Date Time Type Price Size Broker Buy Broker Sell
4012010 08:03:51 BEST BID 11.6 15,531
4012010 08:03:51 BEST BID 11.6 13,531
4012010 08:03:53 BEST ASK 11.61 14,876
4012010 08:03:55 BEST ASK 11.61 9,876
4012010 08:03:55 BEST ASK 11.61 6,876
4012010 08:03:55 BEST BID 11.6 12,331
4012010 08:03:55 TRADE 11.61 1,161 ENS ENS
4012010 08:03:55 TRADE 11.61 39 ENS NON
4012010 08:03:55 BEST ASK 11.61 5,676
4012010 08:03:56 BEST BID 11.6 12,305
4012010 08:03:56 TRADE 11.6 26 ENS NON
4012010 08:03:56 TRADE 11.6 1,305 ENS NON
4012010 08:03:56 TRADE 11.6 669 ENS NON
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Table 4: Performance in the Initial Period.
The table presents the performance of the mean variance portfolios in the initial period:
03=30=2010{08=09=2010 (86 days). There is one portfolio for each broker. The ANON portfolio
is the one that disregards the broker identity, and it is the benchmark portfolio. The investment scenario
is based on a risk-averse investor, who maximizes his expected portfolio return subject to an annual
target volatility p = 10%. Every day, the investor forecasts next day's returns using the order ow
models M1   M2 described in Subsection 3.1, and then rebalances his portfolio weights. The order
ow models are estimated once using all 86 days. We present: the annualized Sharpe ratio (SR) of
each portfolio and .  is the dierence between the brokerj 's and the ANON's performance measure
(MPPM) of Goetzmann et al. (2007), which is expressed in (annualized) percentage points and is for
 = 6. It can be viewed as the maximum performance fee an investor is willing to pay to switch from the
ANON portfolio to the brokerj 's portfolio. When  > 0, market transparency yields positive economic
value to mean variance investors. Following Goetzmann et al. (2007), we test whether the brokerj 's
portfolio signicantly outperforms the ANON portfolio and report the p-values in square brackets. We
bold signicant  on a 10% level.
M1 M2
Broker SR  p-val SR  p-val
AAL 4.82 -1 [0.53] 5.57 2 [0.46]
BPP 5.24 11 [0.32] 6.07 12 [0.29]
CAR 4.66 -8 [0.66] 5.08 -5 [0.61]
CDG 6.23 13 [0.26] 8.39 32 [0.07]
CDV 3.46 -16 [0.83] 5.55 2 [0.45]
CSB 4.75 1 [0.48] 4.58 2 [0.46]
DBL 7.98 28 [0.06] 8.43 31 [0.05]
DDB 7.43 34 [0.06] 7.67 40 [0.04]
DIF 5.44 -8 [0.67] 6.47 3 [0.43]
ENS 5.66 5 [0.40] 6.51 19 [0.23]
EVL 4.04 -22 [0.91] 4.35 -16 [0.80]
FIM 4.42 -7 [0.64] 4.87 -7 [0.65]
FOR 7.62 24 [0.12] 8.61 20 [0.12]
GSI 3.89 -17 [0.83] 5.62 -1 [0.53]
INT 5.99 8 [0.35] 5.48 0 [0.50]
JPM 5.25 11 [0.27] 7.22 29 [0.09]
KEM 5.30 -1 [0.52] 5.85 -1 [0.52]
MLI 5.65 -1 [0.51] 5.17 -6 [0.62]
MSI 6.82 18 [0.15] 6.13 5 [0.40]
NEO 5.33 -4 [0.58] 6.16 5 [0.40]
NIP 4.96 -2 [0.53] 6.25 20 [0.19]
NON 5.67 14 [0.26] 6.94 29 [0.11]
NRD 6.86 23 [0.11] 8.32 30 [0.06]
OPS 3.06 -20 [0.79] 4.05 -13 [0.72]
RBN 5.59 8 [0.36] 6.25 16 [0.23]
SAB 5.94 8 [0.35] 6.79 13 [0.26]
SGP 4.46 -11 [0.73] 4.95 -6 [0.63]
SHB 6.91 22 [0.16] 5.82 10 [0.34]
SWB 5.78 15 [0.21] 7.84 41 [0.03]
UB 5.87 11 [0.30] 6.59 14 [0.26]
UBS 5.55 3 [0.44] 7.41 16 [0.17]
ANON 5.42 0 [0.50] 5.42 0 [0.50]
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Table 5: Does Broker Identity Convey Information?
The table presents the performance of the mean-variance portfolios, using a recursive (out-of-
sample) regression estimation, which is based on a window of expanding size. The period is
08=10=2010{02=28=2011 (124 days). There is one portfolio for each broker. The ANON portfolio is
the one that disregards the broker identity, and it is the benchmark portfolio. The investment scenario
is based on a risk-averse investor, who maximizes his expected portfolio return subject to an annual
target volatility p = 10%. Every day, the investor forecasts next day's returns using the order ow
models M1  M2 described in Subsection 3.1, and then rebalances his portfolio weights. We present:
the annualized Sharpe ratio (SR) of each portfolio and .  is the dierence between the brokerj 's
and the ANON's performance measure (MPPM) of Goetzmann et al. (2007), which is expressed in
(annualized) percentage points and is for  = 6. It can be viewed as the maximum performance fee an
investor is willing to pay to switch from the ANON portfolio to the brokerj 's portfolio. When  > 0,
market transparency yields positive economic value to mean variance investors. Following Goetzmann
et al. (2007), we test whether the brokerj 's portfolio signicantly outperforms the one that disregards
the broker identity and report the p-values in square brackets. We bold signicant  on a 10% level.
M1 M2
Broker SR  p-val SR  p-val
AAL 0.37 10 [0.29] -0.05 6 [0.38]
BPP -0.47 2 [0.44] 0.00 7 [0.33]
CAR 2.93 34 [0.01] 0.72 14 [0.20]
CDG 1.41 23 [0.14] 1.66 22 [0.11]
CDV 1.45 23 [0.08] 0.94 17 [0.17]
CSB 0.51 12 [0.23] 1.45 23 [0.09]
DBL -0.85 -4 [0.59] -1.11 -8 [0.67]
DDB 0.18 8 [0.31] 0.72 14 [0.20]
DIF -0.55 2 [0.45] -0.09 6 [0.36]
ENS 0.81 15 [0.12] -0.79 -1 [0.53]
EVL 1.29 20 [0.15] 0.88 16 [0.19]
FIM 0.17 8 [0.34] 0.47 11 [0.27]
FOR 2.00 27 [0.04] 0.71 14 [0.17]
GSI 1.33 20 [0.09] 1.01 17 [0.15]
INT 1.03 18 [0.13] 0.97 17 [0.14]
JPM 2.21 33 [0.04] 0.65 13 [0.24]
KEM 1.23 19 [0.08] 0.75 14 [0.18]
MLI 0.10 8 [0.32] 0.01 7 [0.33]
MSI 0.75 14 [0.21] 0.60 13 [0.27]
NEO 0.63 13 [0.17] 0.70 14 [0.20]
NIP -0.22 3 [0.42] -0.49 0 [0.49]
NON -1.61 -10 [0.73] -2.04 -15 [0.80]
NRD 2.44 29 [0.02] 2.79 31 [0.03]
OPS 0.30 9 [0.29] 0.74 14 [0.22]
RBN 2.64 36 [0.03] 2.90 38 [0.03]
SAB 0.81 15 [0.22] 0.90 16 [0.19]
SGP 0.19 8 [0.31] 2.14 28 [0.07]
SHB 2.23 29 [0.03] 1.61 23 [0.09]
SWB 2.50 36 [0.03] 1.93 29 [0.06]
UB 0.16 8 [0.29] 0.54 12 [0.23]
UBS 1.42 22 [0.10] 2.08 29 [0.08]
ANON -0.57 0 [0.50] -0.57 0 [0.50]
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Table 6: Brokers' Market Share Statistics.
The table presents the market share statistics of brokers in HEX in the period 03=29=2010-
02=28=2011. The rst statistic (Vol(1) %) is the market share with respect to the average daily
volume initiated by each broker across the 15 most liquid stocks of HEX. The second statistic (Vol(2)
%) is the market share with respect to the average daily volume executed by each broker. We boldface
the larger brokers (Q4) for each market share statistic.
Broker Vol(1) % Vol(2) %
AAL 0.5% 0.6%
BPP 4.1% 4.2%
CAR 1.8% 2.2%
CDG 10.5% 5.8%
CDV 1.7% 1.8%
CSB 7.9% 7.0%
DBL 3.6% 4.7%
DDB 4.3% 3.7%
DIF 0.5% 0.3%
ENS 8.3% 9.0%
EVL 1.1% 1.2%
FIM 4.2% 4.2%
FOR 6.3% 7.1%
GSI 2.5% 2.7%
INT 0.8% 0.8%
JPM 1.6% 1.8%
KEM 0.4% 0.3%
MLI 2.8% 3.1%
MSI 3.2% 4.7%
NEO 1.0% 1.0%
NIP 4.4% 3.0%
NON 4.0% 4.4%
NRD 5.2% 5.6%
OPS 2.3% 3.0%
RBN 0.9% 1.0%
SAB 2.9% 3.1%
SGP 6.4% 4.6%
SHB 2.5% 3.4%
SWB 1.7% 2.0%
UB 0.6% 1.1%
UBS 2.0% 2.7%
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Table 7: Do Large Brokers Outperform Small?
The table presents the performance dierence between a portfolio that tracks large brokers
and one that tracks small brokers. We use 2 market share criteria to categorize brokers: a. with
respect to the average daily volume initiated, Vol(1), and b. the average daily volume executed,
Vol(2). Next, we construct daily average order ow measure series of the top (large brokers - Q4)
and bottom (small brokers - Q1) quartile of brokers for each criterion. We build daily rebalancing
mean-variance portfolios using the order ow models M1   M2, described in Subsection 3.1, to
predict next day's returns. This out-of-sample recursive regression estimation is based on a window
of expanding size in the period 08/10/2010{02/28/2011 (124 days). We estimate the MPPM of
Goetzmann et al. (2007) for each group of brokers and report the performance of each portfolio
against ANON and , which is the performance dierence expressed in annual percentage points
and for  = 6. Following Goetzmann et al. (2007), we test whether the large brokers' portfolio
signicantly outperforms ( > 0) the small brokers' portfolio and report the p-values in square
brackets.
M1 M2
a. Vol(1)
Large Brokers 5 2
p-val [0.36] [0.45]
Small Brokers 39 44
p-val [0.02] [0.00]
 -34 -42
p-val [0.97] [0.99]
b. Vol(2)
Large Brokers -13 -24
p-val [0.79] [0.93]
Small Brokers 38 44
p-val [0.02] [0.00]
 -51 -68
p-val [0.99] [1.00]
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Table 8: Brokers' Investor Base Heterogeneity, Market Share, and Portfolio
Performance.
In panel a., the table presents the correlated trading statistics of the daily trades of brokers
in HEX in the period 03=29=2010-28=02=2011. We measure correlated trading by the herding measure
(LSV) of Lakonishok et al. (1992), which is dened in Equation 9. The LSV statistics are computed
for each stock-day and then averaged. If trades are independent, the mean LSV measure will be zero.
In panel b., we present the average size statistics of the quartile of brokers with the highest (High) and
lowest (Low) LSV statistic. The size is measured with respect to the average daily volume initiated
(Vol(1)) or executed (Vol(2), aggressive and passive) by each broker. In panel c., we construct daily
average order ow measure series of the top (Q4) and bottom (Q1) quartile of brokers, and then we
build daily-rebalancing mean-variance portfolios, using the order ow models M1 M2, described in
Subsection 3.1, to predict next day's returns. This out-of-sample recursive regression estimation is
based on a window of expanding size in the period 08/10/2010{02/28/2011 (124 days). We estimate
the performance measure of Goetzmann et al. (2007) of each quartile of brokers and report ^,
which is the performance dierence between the brokers with high (Q4) and low (Q1) correlated
trading, expressed in annual percentage points and for  = 6. Following Goetzmann et al. (2007), we
test whether the top quartile of brokers signicantly outperforms ( > 0) the bottom quartile. We
report the standard deviation (std) of , and the p-values in square brackets.
a. LSV Statistics
Brokers LSV Brokers LSV Brokers LSV
AAL 0.10 FIM 0.05 NRD 0.11
BPP 0.17 FOR 0.05 OPS 0.10
CAR 0.18 GSI 0.15 RBN 0.27
CDG 0.02 INT 0.23 SAB 0.14
CDV 0.23 JPM 0.24 SGP 0.08
CSB 0.09 KEM 0.23 SHB 0.16
DBL 0.13 MLI 0.11 SWB 0.14
DDB 0.09 MSI 0.19 UB 0.14
DIF 0.03 NEO 0.12 UBS 0.18
ENS 0.15 NIP 0.15
EVL 0.20 NON 0.05
b. LSV and Brokers' Size
LSV Vol(1) Vol(2)
High (Q4) 32,073 79,874
Low (Q1) 120,689 206,390
c. LSV and Mean-Variance Performance
M1 M2
 26 25
p-val [0.08] [0.13]
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Table 9: Active Brokers as Proxy for Sophistication
The table presents the performance of a mean-variance portfolio that uses the average order
ow measure of the most active brokers (Q4 quartile) at time t to predict returns at time t + 1
(Panel a.), t+ 2 (Panel b.), and t+ 3 (Panel c.) using the order ow models M1 M2, described in
Subsection 3.1. We rebalance portfolio's weights on a daily frequency. This out-of-sample recursive
regression estimation is based on a window of expanding size in the period 08/10/2010{02/28/2011
(124 days). We estimate the MPPM of Goetzmann et al. (2007) and report the performance
dierence, , against the portfolio that disregards the broker identity (ANON).  is expressed in
(annualized) percentage points and is for  = 6. When  > 0, market transparency yields positive
economic value to mean-variance investors. Following Goetzmann et al. (2007), we test whether the
portfolio signicantly outperforms the ANON portfolio and report the p-values in square brackets.
M1 M2
a. Use OF it to predict R
i
t+1
 28 39
p-val [0.00] [0.00]
b. Use OF it to predict R
i
t+2
 7 3
p-val [0.30] [0.39]
c. Use OF it to predict R
i
t+3
 10 8
p-val [0.29] [0.30]
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Table 10: Analysis of the Investment Style of Brokers.
The table presents the fraction of positive buy ratio dierences across brokers (including the
ANON portfolio) for the period 03=29=2010{02=28=2011. We follow Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000)
to construct buy ratios: buy volume/(buy volume+sell volume). In our calculations we use only
aggressive trades. Each buy ratio dierence is generated by subtracting the average buy ratio of stocks
in the bottom quartile (losers) from the average buy ratio of stocks in the top quartile (winners).
We use hourly and daily buy ratios, while the past returns used for ranking the stocks are based on
the previous hour and day, respectively. We present the fraction of positive buy ratio dierences
(BRDif). Under the hypothesis of no momentum or contrarian behavior, the average buy ratio
dierence should be zero, and the aforementioned fraction equal to 0.50. A fraction which is larger
than 0.50 indicates a momentum trading behavior, while a fraction smaller than 0.50 indicates a
contrarian behavior. In square brackets we report the p-values of the standard binomial test (p  val)
of whether the fraction of buy ratio dierences is 0.50. We drop zero buy ratio dierences from the
fraction calculation. We bold signicant BRDif on a 10% level.
1 hour 1 day
Broker BRDif p-val BRDif p-val
AAL 0.49 [0.45] 0.39 [0.00]
BPP 0.49 [0.59] 0.50 [0.90]
CAR 0.49 [0.59] 0.50 [0.95]
CDG 0.60 [0.00] 0.55 [0.13]
CDV 0.57 [0.00] 0.50 [0.89]
CSB 0.43 [0.00] 0.57 [0.04]
DBL 0.42 [0.00] 0.28 [0.00]
DDB 0.42 [0.00] 0.52 [0.47]
DIF 0.46 [0.00] 0.57 [0.03]
ENS 0.43 [0.00] 0.41 [0.01]
EVL 0.49 [0.30] 0.45 [0.15]
FIM 0.40 [0.00] 0.49 [0.74]
FOR 0.58 [0.00] 0.65 [0.00]
GSI 0.55 [0.00] 0.59 [0.01]
INT 0.56 [0.00] 0.58 [0.02]
JPM 0.59 [0.00] 0.55 [0.17]
KEM 0.60 [0.00] 0.56 [0.13]
MLI 0.52 [0.13] 0.49 [0.74]
MSI 0.43 [0.00] 0.41 [0.00]
NEO 0.53 [0.02] 0.57 [0.04]
NIP 0.55 [0.00] 0.51 [0.74]
NON 0.34 [0.00] 0.53 [0.39]
NRD 0.40 [0.00] 0.35 [0.00]
OPS 0.41 [0.00] 0.39 [0.00]
RBN 0.55 [0.00] 0.53 [0.33]
SAB 0.60 [0.00] 0.68 [0.00]
SGP 0.48 [0.04] 0.48 [0.47]
SHB 0.51 [0.38] 0.55 [0.17]
SWB 0.53 [0.04] 0.58 [0.02]
UB 0.47 [0.06] 0.53 [0.44]
UBS 0.58 [0.00] 0.59 [0.00]
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Table 11: Do Momentum Brokers Outperform Contrarian?
The table presents the performance of a mean-variance portfolio that uses the average order
ow of momentum brokers at time t to predict returns at time t+1 using the order ow models
M1 - M2, described in Subsection 3.1. We repeat for contrarian brokers. We follow Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2000) to characterize brokers as momentum or contrarian. Momentum are the brokers
with daily buy ratio dierence fraction signicantly (p-value< 5%) greater than 0:50. Contrarian
are the brokers with daily buy ratio dierence fraction signicantly (p-value< 5%) smaller than
0:50. We rebalance portfolio's weights on a daily frequency. This out-of-sample recursive regression
estimation is based on a window of expanding size in the period 08/10/2010{02/28/2011 (124 days).
We estimate the MPPM of Goetzmann et al. (2007) and report the performance dierence of the two
portfolios against the one that disregards the broker identity (ANON). We also report , which is
the performance dierence between the momentum and contrarian portfolio. Performance dierences
are expressed in annual percentage points and are for  = 6. Following Goetzmann et al. (2007),
we test if the two portfolios signicantly outperform ( > 0) the ANON portfolio, as well as if the
momentum portfolio signicantly outperforms ( > 0) the contrarian. We report the p-values in
square brackets.
M1 M2
Momentum 15 30
p-val [0.11] [0.01]
Contrarian 6 2
p-val [0.37] [0.46]
 9 28
p-val [0.29] [0.04]
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Table 12: Stock Picking Ability and Investment Style
The table shows the relation between stock picking ability and investment style in the period
03=29=2010{02=28=2011. We follow Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) to construct buy ratio dierence
fractions based on future one- and three-months returns in order to measure brokers' stock picking
ability. In the absence of stock picking ability, the average buy ratio dierence should be zero, and
the aforementioned fraction equal to 0.50. A fraction larger (smaller) than 0.50 means that the stocks
brokers buy on a daily basis have a positive (negative) one- or three-months performance, thus,
brokers have high (low) stock picking ability. We split brokers into two groups; those with high stock
picking ability (Q4 quartile), and those with low stock picking ability (Q1 quartile). We, then, follow
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) to measure brokers' investment style and report the relevant average
buy ratio dierence fraction (BRDif) of each group based on one-day past returns. A fraction
which is larger than 0.50 indicates a momentum trading behavior, while a fraction smaller than 0.50
indicates a contrarian behavior. We, also, report the dierence of investment styles of the two groups
and the associated p-value in square brackets.
Stock Picking Ability BRDif Investment Style
a. 1 month
High (Q4) 0.57 Momentum
Low (Q1) 0.48 Contrarian
Q4-Q1 0.09
p-val [0.00]
b. 3 months
High (Q4) 0.56 Momentum
Low (Q1) 0.46 Contrarian
Q4-Q1 0.10
p-val [0.00]
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